Polish-Muscovite War

Polish-Muscovite War - (the final part of the Dymitriads) an armed conflict between the Shuisky faction in the Tsardom of Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, taking place in years 1609-1614. The conflict formally began due to the formation of a Russian-Swedish alliance, but it was a de facto continuation of Commonwealth's szlachta's involvement in the Russian affairs during the country's crisis. The conflict has resulted in a decisive Polish-Lithuanian victory, resulting in the election of king Sigismund III's son, Vladislav, to the throne of Moscow due to the Treaty of Podolsk, end of the Russian Time of Troubles, territorial concessions and a formation of a Polish-Russian dynastic alliance against the Swedish.

Historical Background
The Time of Troubles - Russian period of political and economic instability - began after the death of the last Tsar of the Rurikovich dynasty, Fyodor I, in 1598. After initial years of chaos and famine, the realm was thrown into a violent succession crisis. Polish-Lithuanian magnates have been involved in it since the beginning of the 17th century, when they declared support for Dimitry I, a self-proclaimed lost son of Ivan IV the Terrible. Seeking influence, they managed to install him as a Tsar of Russia for a brief period of time, before he had lost support and was overthrown and executed due to intrigues of the boyars, accusing him of subservience to the Poles. The opposition led by Vasily Shuisky quickly took power and declared Vasily a Tsar of Russia. However, soon after the death of the usurper, a new Dimitry (called the Bandit of Tushino by the Russians due to the place where he rallied his army for the first time) had started a new faction, once more supported by the Polish. With an anti-boyar sentiment he rallied a lot of popular support and by the end of 1608 he had managed to take control over large swathes of Eastern and Southern Russia. Due to the danger Tsar Vasily Shuisky has sought in this Polish-supported pretender, he had sought closer relations with the Kingdom of Sweden. Sigismund III Vasa, the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, had unofficially supported nobility's private endeavours, but did not drag the state into direct involvement in Muscovy, as the country's war over Livonia with Sweden and period of political instability and friction, climaxing in the Zebrzydowski rebellion in years 1606-1609, were prioritized by both the royalty and Sejm. It was only after Vasily Shuisky signed an alliance with Sweden in February 1609, when Zygmunt III formally declared war. After wrapping up the conflict between the royal faction and the opposition during the pacification Sejm of 1609, Sigismund III could dedicate most of the state's attention to the incoming Muscovite campaign. Despite the final decision being made so late, the idea of an official intervention in Russia had already rallied a lot of support in most politically empowered groups. Magnates saw it as an opportunity to expand their influence over Russia, while lower and middle class szlachta hoped to establish a political union with Muscovy, or at least install a favourable pretender, to end the hostilities between the Tsardom and the Commonwealth and resolve the border issues onto the latter's favour (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has lost control over Smolensk in 1514), bringing a new age of cooperation between the realms anf establishing an alliance against Turkish and Swedish threats. Clergymen and the more radical catholic factions among with Sigismund have sought it as an opportunity to catholicize Russia and mend the schism between Eastern and Roman-Catholic churches. The Lithuanian nobility has also favoured intervention as they sought a friendly Russian state as a means of counterbalance to the increasing Polish cultural and political influence in the Union. The Lithuanian chancellor, Lew Sapieha, responsible for Commonwealth's Eastern diplomacy, had in fact played a large role in rallying support for the campaign. As a result, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could raise significantly large war taxes and engage itself into a longer campaign outside of its borders, something it hasn't done since the last offensives in North-Western Russia by Stephan Batory during the Livonian Wars.

Preparation of Forces
The Commonwealth issued mobilization of forces during the Sejm session in April. Command over the campaign was given to the Polish hetman, Stanisław Żółkiewski. By the end of Summer, in Witebsk, the Polish-Lithuanian side managed to rally close to 80,000 men. Among them there were 25 thousand infantrymen, (19,000 from the Crown of Poland and 6,000 from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a small Lithuanian force led by Hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz was already fighting in Livonia), 10,000 light cavalry forces, among which several thousand Lisowczycy cavalrymen, close to 8,000 winged Hussars and a 30,000 strong army of registered Zaporozhian Cossacks under command of Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny. The last force in fact arrived a month later, postponing the Polish plans to early September.

Shuisky faction had much less men for disposition. The Russian army, worn out and decimated by constant turmoil, having significant parts of the country occupied by hostile forces, had to settle for 30,000 footmen, most of which were untrained conscripts. The only proffessional force in the Russian army was the boyar cavalry force, size of which was estimated for 6-8 thousand men. Vasily IV wanted to slow down the Polish march East and had sent a contingent to reinforce the most important fortress in the region - the city of Smolensk - and scorched the area around it. The main army, led by Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky, was also sent closer to the frontier. The Russian Tsar realized the disproportion of forces, but having signed an alliance with the Swedish, he had hoped for reinforcements, which could improve his standing or an agressive campaign which would force the Poles to split their forces.